FAIR PLAY BEYOND THE FIELD: LESSONS FROM INDIA AND BEYOND

INTRODUCTION

Can your favourite sports federation stop you from joining another league? At first glance, this might look like a sporting policy question. But in reality, it is a legal one rooted in Competition law. In today’s world, sports are no longer confined to fair play on the field. They have become billion-dollar industries powered by profit sharing, broadcasting and rights to Over-the-Top platforms, sponsorships and merchandising. With this rise in commercial component of professional sports organisations comes the risk of abuse of dominance, restrictive agreements and unfair restrictions on athletes and organisers.

Competition Law[1], previously governed by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969[2], traditionally deals with monopolies, price-fixing and cartels has now entered the sporting arena. Courts and regulators globally are grappling with the delicate balance between preserving the autonomy of sports federations and ensuring fair competition in the marketplace. India is no exception. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has dealt with multiple cases involving cricket, hockey, and more recently, table tennis. Together, these cases raise a crucial question: Should sports federations, while historically shielded by their regulatory status should act only as referees of the game, or are they also market players bound by the rules of fair competition?

WHY IT MATTERS NOW

This is not an academic debate, rather it is being played out internationally and defining the future of sport governance.

In Europe, the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) decided in 2023 on the extremely contentious European Super League. According to the court, UEFA and FIFA's provisions mandating advance approval for breakaway leagues have to be compatible with EU competition law. The decision was landmark as it established that even influential international sports organizations are not immune to scrutiny concerning competition.

In the US, sports leagues have traditionally received privileged treatment. Major League Baseball still enjoys its antitrust exemption dating back a century. However, the NCAA (college athletic association) has been confronted aggressively, with courts invalidating regulations limiting athlete pay.

In India, the competition law story is still evolving. Early cases against Hockey India[3] and the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI)[4] revealed hesitation in regulating powerful federations. But more recent decisions, especially the Table Tennis Friendly Super League case[5] shows the CCI’s willingness to hold even non-profit federations accountable.

This prevailing global trend  makes one point clear: competition law is no longer on the sidelines of sports; it is actively refereeing how the game is governed.

THE INDIAN EXPERIENCES: CASE STUDIES

1. Hockey India (2013)

The CCI investigated allegations of abuse of dominance by Hockey India by limiting the participation of players in competing tournaments. Although the regulator recognized the body's dominance, it could not establish definitive abuse. The case exemplified the conservative approach, viewing sports federations more as regulators than economic actors.[6]

2. BCCI (2018)

The BCCI, perhaps the most dominant sports federation in India, was charged with its abuse of dominance with respect to media rights of the Indian Premier League (IPL). The CCI adjudicated against BCCI, finding that it unjustly restricted access by imposing conditions that denied entry to potential rivals. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the decision of the CCI. This case represented a move towards tougher enforcement, acknowledging that federations with commercial interests should not abuse their authority.[7]

3. Table Tennis Friendly Super League (2024)

This is the latest and perhaps most consequential case. The Table Tennis Federation of India (TTFI) and state associations subordinate to it were accused of releasing a WhatsApp advisory advising players, coaches, and clubs against taking part in tournaments hosted by independent parties.

The CCI held that  such advisories were found to operate as barriers to entry, amounting to an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act by effectively excluding certain players from the market. The CCI further noted that provisions in the constitutions of the associations imposing blanket prohibitions were inherently restrictive and could not be justified. Although no financial penalty was imposed due to corrective actions taken, the CCI warned against any future anti-competitive conduct[8].

The innovation in this case lies in its broad interpretation. The CCI believed that even unofficial advisories, and not merely official rules, were anti-competitive. More significantly, it established that the non-profit or regulatory nature of federations does not confer immunity when they engage in commercial markets.

LESSONS FROM ABROAD

India’s perspective can be better understood in light of global trends.

• United States: Baseball enjoys a unique exemption from antitrust law[9], dating back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Basketball Club v. National League (1922)[10]. Courts later narrowed this exemption to only the Player Reserve System[11], but it still shields Major League Baseball from certain challenges. In contrast, Major League Soccer succeeded in arguing itself as a single entity, meaning it could not conspire with itself under antitrust law (Fraser v. MLS)[12]. These instances demonstrate how US courts frequently favour federation autonomy, however recent rulings against the NCAA point to a shift.

• European Union: The EU takes a more assertive stand[13]. The CJEU ruled in Meca-Medina v. Commission (2006)[14] that, even when sporting integrity is invoked to defend a rule, it is nevertheless subject to EU competition law if it has an economic impact. This trend is maintained with the 2023 Super League decision against UEFA[15]. The EU does not grant extensive exemptions for sports, in contrast to the US.

Takeaway for India: India’s trajectory seems closer to the EU model. The Table Tennis case in particular reflects this stricter approach, wherein federations are being held accountable when they restrict access or abuse dominance.

KEY ISSUES AT STAKE

The central issues in contention reflect broader systemic challenges within sports governance. Conflicts of interest arise as sports federations invoke the need for autonomy to preserve fair play while simultaneously controlling broadcasting rights, sponsorship and tournament approvals. Blanket bans on participation in unauthorised tournaments further restrict player freedom, directly limiting athletes’ professional opportunities, as seen in TTFI’s advisory bans. Additionally, when federations operate both as regulators and as market participants competing for sponsorships and media rights, the risk of exclusionary or anti-competitive conduct increases, exemplified by concerns raised in relation to the BCCI’s media rights practices.

WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE

India’s recent cases highlight the urgent need for structural reforms in sports governance: Here are some possible solutions.

1. Regulatory Separation through Firewalls: Federations should be required to separate their regulatory and commercial role. Discipline, athlete registration should be segregated from broadcasting, sponsorships and merchandising to reduce conflict of interest, preventing regulatory powers from being used for market advantage. A similar structural approach has been adopted in the United Kingdom, where the 2023 Football Governance White Paper proposed the establishment of an independent regulator to oversee football governance[16]. Although driven by financial stability rather than competition law, the reform demonstrates that separating regulatory oversight from commercial activities can reduce conflicts of interest.

2. Amend the National Sports Code: The sports code should explicitly include competition compliance obligations. For example:

• Blanket Bans on unauthorised tournaments should be prohibited unless justified by clear sporting integrity concerns.

• Federations must submit their bye-laws for annual compliance review by an independent body.

3. Mandatory Transparency Portals: All federations should maintain online portals where advisories, rules and eligibility criteria are published within 7 days. Any unpublished or secret advisory should be deemed unenforceable.

4. Athlete-Centric Approach: Athletes are often the weakest stakeholders in the governance chain. Regulations should prioritise their rights, including freedom to participate in tournaments, fair contracts and protection against exploitation, an approach reinforced by elements of the EU Athletes’ Rights Charter, which recognises basic safeguards for athlete welfare.[17]

CONCLUSION

Competition law’s growing role in sports is not a passing fad but a natural response to the way games have become highly commercial and how federations have accumulated power. The Indian experience makes this clear – sports bodies can no longer shield themselves with the excuse of being “non-profit regulators” when they act as market players.

The trajectory of cases tells its own story. The Hockey India case showed hesitation. The BCCI case reflected stronger enforcement. The TTFI case demonstrated the boldest approach yet. Together, these cases signal a clear message: the spirit of fair play applies both on and off the field.

Globally, the trajectory is towards greater scrutiny and India is aligning with the movement to strike a balance between autonomy and accountability. In the end, competition law acts as the ultimate referee, ensuring that the beautiful game, in whichever sport, is played not just fairly on the field but also in the boardrooms where the real power lies.

Authored by - Tanya Sharma

Edited by - Samyukhta

[1] Competition Act 2002 (India).

[2] Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 (India).

[3] Dhanraj Pillay v Hockey India Case No 73 of 2011 (CCI, 31 July 2013).

[4] Board of Control for Cricket in India v Competition Commission of India (2018) 6 SCC 287 (SC, India).

[5] TT Friendly Super League Association v Table Tennis Federation of India Case No 19 of 2021 (CCI, 12 December 2024).

[6] Hockey India case (n 3).

[7] BCCI case (n 4).

[8] TTFI case (n 5).

[9] M M Sharma, ‘Economics of Exemptions from Competition Law’ (2013) 24 National Law School of India Review62; Sherman Antitrust Act 15 USC §§ 1–7 (1890); Federal Trade Commission Act 15 USC §§ 41–58 (1914); Clayton Antitrust Act 15 USC §§ 12–27 (1914).

[10] Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore Inc v National League of Professional Baseball Clubs 259 US 200 (1922).

[11] Piazza v Major League Baseball 831 F Supp 420 (ED Pa 1993).

[12] Fraser v Major League Soccer 284 F 3d 47 (1st Cir 2002).

[13] Stephen Weatherill, ‘Can EU Competition Law Save Sports Governance?’ (2024) International Sports Law Journal <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-024-00258-9>; Ben Van Rompuy, ‘ISU and Superleague Judgments: Sports Governance in the Market-Driven Era’ (2024) International Sports Law Journal <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-024-00261-0>.

[14] Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-6991.

[15] European Super League Company SL v UEFA Joined Cases C-333/21, C-334/21 and C-335/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1011 (CJEU, 21 December 2023).

[16]UK Government, A Sustainable Future – Reforming Club Football Governance (CP 804, 2023) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-sustainable-future-reforming-club-football-governance/a-sustainable-future-reforming-club-football-governance>

[17] Council of Europe, Revised European Sports Charter (2021) <https://edoc.coe.int/en/sport-for-all/11299-revised-european-sports-charter.html>.