When the Auctioneer Owns the Auction: India’s Media Law vs. Ad-Tech Gatekeepers

In 2022, Viacom18 (a Reliance-backed venture) ₹23,758 crore acquisition of IPL digital rights signalled a troubling shift in Indian media: ownership of broadcast rights no longer guaranteed control over the revenues generated from them. Jio’s ability to break even depends on being able to generate revenue from the digital advertising market, but the way that the digital advertising market is monetized is through a real-time auction system, where advertisers bid on audiences, and key layers of that system are substantially mediated by Google’s integrated ad-tech stack. As a result, the central media law question becomes: when a single entity controls the system that monetizes expression, who truly owns the media? We argue that the ad-tech stack in India reflects a media diversity crisis rather than a competition law issue and call for re-examining the editorial control, broadcast autonomy, and content diversity in the media and information regulations.

I. The Problem of Media Ownership: When Distribution and Monetization Part Ways

The IPL case demonstrates a deeper issue within telecommunications. Jio has the exclusive rights for the distribution of what is likely India’s most valuable entertainment business, however, having the rights to distribute does Jio no good if they cannot capitalize on those rights independently. This point is illustrated by Jio’s ad-monetisation architecture: although it gives advertisers access to over 500+ million potential customers, the underlying ad management system largely operates as a “black box,” with key layers of monetisation mediated through Google’s Ad Manager, AdX and DV360.

Historically, broadcast law treats the ownership of media as giving the owner the ability to both control what gets broadcast, and to make money from what gets broadcast. If ownership rights are split - that is, there is content without a monetization mechanism, the very definition of “ownership” becomes blurred.

Programmatic advertising has a three-layer structure: a Publisher Ad Server (Google Ad Manager) is the entity making the determination on which ad to display, an Ad Exchange (Google AdX) is the entity running the real-time auction, and a Demand-Side Platform (Google DV360) allows advertisers to place their bids. In a properly functioning market all three entities would exist as independent companies with competing interests - however, Google controls all three of those company types. In the case of Jio, the entity to which the ad revenue is collected, also controls the auction, the rules to that auction and places the bids on behalf of its advertiser clients. Jio’s lack of a mechanism to determine whether it receives a fair rate for advertisement space results in an inevitable outcome. An organisation known as the Alliance of Digital India Foundation (ADIF) has tracked the effects of this situation: the cost of Google Ad Manager has increased from approximately 9% to over 30% (it has been bundled with the dealing platform Google Ad Exchange (AdX) in ways that limit the options available to publishers); and publishers do not have access to sufficient data to conclusively demonstrate that they are receiving prices that are clearing the market. Advertising revenue is not incidental to broadcasting; it is the economic basis on which large-scale content remains free, widely accessible, and editorially viable.

II. Media Plurality and the Gatekeeping Question

The concentration reflects a long-standing debate about the media and who controls the gate to the audience. Previously, that gate was controlled by cable companies and distribution networks today it’s controlled by whoever decides which voices can financially survive in order to have a chance at telling their story.

Consider the IPL example on a larger scale. If Jio can’t recover their investment through advertising revenues, they will have three options: accept whatever the ad-tech system provides; go to a subscription basis; or cut back on content investments. All three of these will have an impact on media diversity. With lower advertising revenues, the conglomerates/vertically integrated media conglomerates are able to look at bundling and/or putting together content with another company; if companies are forced to rely on subscription fees for their revenue, they will limit the audience because of the subscription model; and if they have to reduce the amount of money spent on premium rights, there will be fewer players competing for premium content.

The same problem affects print and digital publishers. When monetisation infrastructure is concentrated, only large players can afford to maintain their own technical stack or absorb inefficient ad pricing. Smaller publishers remain dependent on opaque platforms, weakening the economic basis of media diversity. Smaller publishers and content creators are effectively trapped in the ecosystem created by Google. This is inconsistent with a key principle of broadcast regulation in India, where the right to broadcast is only equitable to provide both control of distribution and sustainable economic means to provide the right to broadcast. Therefore, if monetization is controlled by outside parties, the right to broadcast is significantly compromised.

III. The Regulatory Gap: Why Competition Law Isn’t Enough

Finally, there appears to be an awareness at the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”). In August 2025, following the complaints of multiple publishers, the CCI merged the complaints with a complaint submitted by the Association of Digital India Publishers (“ADIF”), initiated an investigation into Google’s display advertising practices for possible violations of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. Section 4 of that law prohibits firms found to have a dominant position from engaging in conduct that entails the imposition of unfair or unreasonable terms, restrictions on market access, or leveraging of their dominant position across two or more markets.

Yet, competition law principally focuses on issues arising from the lack of alternatives for Jio and, other publishers, in the advertising technology space; i.e., are there viable substitutes for Google’s ad exchange services or have the publishers the ability to vertically integrate to eliminate their dependency on Google, etc., and, while there are questions associated to these issues, they are not questions that arise from media law. Rather, and from a media law perspective, the questions relate to whether that form of gatekeeping is reducing the diversity of financially viable content, consolidating editorial control of one portion of the media value chain and, whether the investment made by the IPL can ultimately be sustainable.

The distinction is very important, as the remedies are different. A competition remedy would require Google to separate its ad server from its exchange, while a remedy under media laws would require broadcasters to have independent control over their monetization or prohibit gatekeepers from using ad-tech in a manner that allows them to interfere with editorial decision-making. However, the Indian broadcasting regulatory framework does not have any provisions relating to ad-tech gatekeeping. The draft Broadcasting Services Regulation Bill, 2023 does not include reference to digital ad intermediaries, whereas the Information Technology Act, 2000 generally relates to intermediaries but does not place obligations on ad-tech gatekeepers in relation to publishers’ autonomy, and the proposed Digital India Act does not address the advertising infrastructure at all. Notably, even the most recent regulatory developments do not fill this gap: in February 2025, TRAI released recommendations for a framework for broadcasting service authorisations under the Telecommunications Act, 2023, but these deal exclusively with licensing, fees, and infrastructure not with ad-tech intermediaries, publisher monetisation rights, or auction transparency.  The CCI investigation can expose the economic structure of ad-tech dependence, but a complete response requires media regulators and lawmakers to treat monetisation infrastructure as part of the conditions for media plurality.

IV. International Media Law Approaches

Currently, multiple countries are developing a media-based approach to dealing with ad-tech gatekeepers. For example, under Sector Specific Laws of the EU (Digital markets Act, or DMA); Article 5 provides for publishers to flag ad inventory that has not been automatically processed, while Article 6(8), mandates publishers to have free access to performance data so that they can independently validate their ad placements. The idea is to correct an information imbalance because gatekeepers exert significant information control over the ability of the publishers to operate autonomously. The imbalance needs to be addressed via transparency, rather than only through competition, due to the media regulation premise.

The UK’s competition authority is investigating Google’s Privacy Sandbox, as to whether or not those changes to the browser-level would cause additional concentration of ad-tech power because platform providers’ choices regarding technical architecture are viewed as a form of gatekeeping impacting upon media plurality. In April 2025, a U.S. District Court judge has ruled in favour of claims that Google has unlawfully monopolized the market for publisher ad servers and for display ad exchanges on open web media in the U.S., which harms “publisher customers”; this is a term commonly used in media law to reflect the concept that publishers are key to media diversity. However, no regulatory regime has yet developed a comprehensive media law theory of ad-tech gatekeeping, leaving this challenge in the hands of Indian regulators.

V. Towards Media Law Regulation

India can significantly improve its media law framework through three specific reforms:

Changing the character of the CCI investigation (current or future) to a media plurality inquiry rather than a re-examination of market competition as a sole criterion will include consideration of whether the current structure allows for sustainable and economically viable publication operations by both large and small publishers. Emphasis will move from “market competition” (does Jio compete with other exchanges or not?) to “diverse content,” aiming for records of thin media (only being presented by vertically-integrated consolidators) and preventing vertical market consolidation by any company involved in the media industry.

Regulation of ad-tech providers on an industry basis is needed and necessary. The government should enact a separate Digital Media Infrastructure Law or incorporate the necessary provisions through rulemaking under the Telecommunications Act, 2023, which now serves as the operative framework for broadcasting service authorisation that stipulates: (I) that auction mechanics and real-time pricing information must be disclosed to all publishers; (III) that ad tech providers can’t manage ad servers, exchanges, and planning for third-party inventory; and (III) that ALL inventory from all publishers must be treated equally with respect to planning and execution of campaign advertising. The above provisions do not fall under anti-competitive law but are necessary to ensure the sustainability of media through the absence of bias from conflicted intermediary parties.

Third, treat ad-tech auctions as infrastructure, not mere transactions. An auction where half the participants can’t see the rules or results is not real competition — it is a gatekeeping mechanism. The CCI should make auction transparency a core remedy, including a disclosure order requiring real-time reporting of auction mechanics to the regulator, with anonymized data made available to publishers.

In the IPL case, the payoff is concrete: Jio gains real control over monetizing its content, rival broadcasters get a transparent and equitable infrastructure, advertisers access a less concentrated auction, and investment shifts toward content and diversity over technical integration.

VI. Conclusion: Media Ownership in the Digital Age

Jio’s acquisition of IPL digital rights was initially viewed as a disruption of legacy broadcast ownership. But the digital media economy reveals a more complex problem: owning valuable content does not necessarily mean controlling the infrastructure through which that content is monetised. If ad-tech platforms control auction rules, pricing information and access to advertiser demand, they can shape the economic conditions under which media enterprises survive. This is not merely a competition concern; it is a media-law concern because monetisation affects plurality, editorial autonomy and investment in diverse content. India’s current regulatory framework does not yet recognise this connection. The CCI’s investigation may expose the structure of ad-tech dependence, but a durable solution requires lawmakers to treat monetisation infrastructure as part of the architecture of media freedom.

Authors: Nishant Tripathi and Devansh Awasthi are 2nd Year, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) students at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow