Centralising the Field: A Constitutional Critique of the National Sports Governance Act, 2025

Introduction

The National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (“the Act”) stands as the most groundbreaking enactment in Post-Independence Sports Governance in India. Widely viewed as a turning point, the Act replaces National Sports Development Code, 2011, which had operated merely as a non-binding, and establishes a legally binding structure. The legislation intended to establish a comprehensive statutory framework to ensure the transparent, ethical, and accountable governance of National Sports Federations (“NSFs”), while simultaneously safeguarding the rights and welfare of athletes through provisions for safe sport practices and institutionalised grievance redressal mechanisms. However, underlying tensions exist between state autonomy and centralisation, athlete rights, transparency, and accountability.

The Act, which follows several unsuccessful attempts in the past to regulate sports governance through legislative means, aims to eliminate factionalism, political interference, and administrative arbitrariness, which have hitherto impeded the orderly development of sports infrastructure and athlete-centric policymaking in India. It aspires to cultivate a dispute-free mechanism, a professional sporting environment, and elevate governance standards in line with internationally recognised norms.

A salient feature of Act is that it aligns with the Olympic and Paralympic Charters, indicating India’s ambition to host major international sporting events, including a potential bid for the 2036 Olympic Games.

Institutional Framework: Reform or  Centralisation?

The Act created institutions such as the national sports board (‘NSB’), national sports tribunal (‘NST’), and national sports election panel, intending to ensure transparency, accountability, and efficiency in sport governance. However, the delegation of extensive authority to state-backed institutions raises plenty of serious legitimacy issues.

National Sports Board (NSB)

The NSB has the authority to recognise or derecognise the status of federations, financial checks, monitor compliance, and perform supervision. But its undefined power to suspend and dissolve association without criteria and procedural safeguards will allow NSB to revoke association status unilaterally. Such broad executive power directly conflicts with the principle of the Olympic Charter, Rule 27 mandates that “National Olympic Committees, along with their affiliated association,  “must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures. Due to the absence of clear procedures or criteria for derecognition in the Act, it leaves federations at risk of political and other pressure, which the Charter expressly forbids.

Past international rulings give a clear warning to maintain autonomy. One major incident was when the Indian Olympic Association was suspended after “government interference and bad governance” by the International Olympic Committee.   India must take lesson from it and exercise prudence and strictness to safeguard its international credibility.

National Sports Tribunal (NST) : A Crisis of Judicial Independence

“The NST is constituted of a retired Supreme Court Judge or a former chief justice of a high court, alongside two domain experts”. While the tribunal is broadly vested with authority to adjudicate on all sports governance disputes (but the Act does not specify the scope or nature of any dispute), only explicitly excludes doping violations, which are governed by National Anti-Doping Act 2022.

The NST independence is uncertain because appointments are influenced by the executive. Further complicating matters, unlike other tribunals (the TRAI tribunal, which explicitly specifies list of disputes, under section 14), NST does not specify any dispute scope or nature that complicates its jurisdiction. The Act's silence creates a jurisdictional grey area, whether the dispute of player selection will be taken or not

“The appointment in NST by search-cum-selection committee, which consists the chief justice of India (CJI) or a Supreme Court judge nominated by the CJI, the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Justice, and the Secretary of the Department of Sports”. This composition is against the independence of tribunals and the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew vs South Indian Bank Ltd 2019 held that the executive cannot have more control in the selection process of tribunals. The court also observed that if a judicial member does not have a majority in the selection process, then it violates the separation of powers.

The composition of the NST selection committee stands in direct conflict with the legislation passed by parliament, the Tribunals Reform Act, 2021 (Specifically, it's section 3) under this Act appointment committee must be balanced - two members from the judiciary and two from the executive and The chairperson (judicial member) has a casting vote in case of a tie, which ensures that the judiciary has the final say. By ignoring this framework, the Act removes the procedural checks and balances necessary to keep the tribunal independent.

Additionally, there is no clarity on domestic adjudication, international norms, and interaction with “the Court of Arbitration for Sport” (CAS). This ambiguity creates conflict between NST decisions and CAS obligations, leaving athletes in a jurisdictional grey area.    

This clearly illustrates that the Act objective is to enhance transparency and fairness, but in reality, is an executive overreach instead of judicial independence.

Constitutional and Legal Tensions

Several constitutional questions emerge from the Act. First, Legislative Competence: Union vs. State Jurisdiction: Entry 33 of the state list (list II) explicitly classifies “Sports” as a state domain. However, judicial interpretations have held that the Union possesses authority to regulate national and international sports under the residuary power granted by Article 248. Union exercise this power through Entry 97 of List 1 (which covers residuary matters not enumerated in other lists), alongside Entry 10 (which brings all foreign affairs matters under union jurisdiction), and Entry 13 (which pertains to participation in international conferences and the implementation of decisions made). Thus, the aggressive use of these union provisions to legislate on a specific State subject signals a shift toward centralisation that infringes upon the principle of constitutional federalism.

Second, A core tension exists between the Act and the freedom of association guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c). The federation contended that undue state intervention infringes the constitutional right of freedom and the right to self-govern. This claim is supported by the Supreme Court ruling. In Zee Telefilms v Union of India court acknowledged the autonomy of BCCI (Board of Control for Cricket in India) despite its public functions. noting that “it was neither a statutory body nor under government control or funded” Rather, it was a private entity of individuals running cricket. Thus, this judicial precedent creates a legitimate expectation for other federations since they share the same legal character as the BCCI, so similarly, their autonomy will also be protected in governance and work against excessive state interference.

Safe Sport: A Framework Without Force

The ACT mandates measures to protect women, minors and other marginalised groups from harassment and abuse. but the Act is limited to these categories and leaves uncertainty over broader issues such as crowd control, facility hazards, welfare of coaches and staff – areas that have long been exposed to weakness in sports governance. The recent tragedy in RCB’s victory celebrations at Bengaluru’s Chinnaswamy Stadium caused by insufficient approval, poor coordination and no preparedness resulted in deaths and injuries. Highlight the urgent need for safety protocols that are missing in the ACT. Although the Safe Sports Policy is progressive in principle but issues are largely unaddressed. Without clarity and enforcement, the policy risks remaining symbolic rather than truly transformative.

Shielding BCCI  from Public Scrutiny ( Right to Information)

To enhance transparency, the Act includes all recognised federations as public authorities subject to the Right to Information Act 2005 (RTI). However, section 34 of the Act creates a conspicuous exception for BCCI within the Indian sports landscape by excluding it from the RTI. legally, it is a private association registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. However, functionally, it exercises authority typically like statutory or governmental body. It holds a de facto monopoly over cricket in India by managing everything from domestic tournaments, national team selection, to international representation and broadcasting rights.

Judicial interpretation of BCCI, the Supreme Court In Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India held that the BCCI does not fall as  “State” under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. The court applied the test established in  Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute Of Chemical Biology and concluded that the BCCI lacks financial, functional, and administrative control by the government, making it ineligible for classification as a State. However, in BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar, the Court held that BCCI exercised “monopolistic public functions,” so even if it remains technically outside the definition of “State,” it will be subject matter to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 (emphasis to bring constitutional accountability). The Supreme Court supported the Lodha Committee’s recommendations to reform the BCCI structure to bring more transparency and accountability.

Following this, “the Law Commission of India in its 275th report, titled Legal framework BCCI vis-a-vis Right to Information Act 2005, concluded that BCCI should be classified as state under Article 12 and should come under RTI”.

After the report, the Central Information Commission (“CIC”), a statutory body under the RTI Act 2005, held that BCCI is a public authority under the national sport federation and directed the BCCI president to make a system to receive applications under RTI within 30 days. BCCI challenged the order in the Madras High Court. The court issued a stay on the CIC’s decision and ruled, “there may be public sentiment who will say BCCI should come under RTI, but it is parliament to decide this; unless the law is amended, until BCCI cannot be compelled to comply with RTI provisions.”

The Madras High Court ruling clarified that only Parliament can bring the BCCI under RTI. still, the question is, what is stopping parliament from doing so? When the BILL was introduced, it included BCCI under RTI, but was later amended and excluded when passed. This suggests a political decision over governance reform. creating a paradox as the Act was designed to enhance transparency and accountability; however, it protects the richest and most influential cricket board in the world, undermining the very objective of the Act.

Conclusion: A Structure Remaining Incomplete

Undoubtedly, the Act stands as a landmark enactment. It reflects India’s intent to reform and modernise governance of sports. However, the Act remains a half-built bridge, visionary yet structurally incomplete. It requires improvement in protecting federation autonomy, subjecting the BCCI to RTI, and making clear laws for athlete rights. Later, how these gaps are bridged during their implementation will shape the future of Indian sports and India’s reputation in the global sporting arena.

Authored by - Anand Prakash Patel, Second-year law student at Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur.

Edited by - Samyuktha Anuram